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Some have speculated that explanatory style puts an individual at risk for 
illness. Study I supports this hypothesis by showing that college students who 
believe that stable + global factors caused bad events experienced more days 
o f  illness in the following month and visited physicians more frequently in 
the following year than students who explain bad events with unstable + 
specific causes. These findings held even when level o f  previous illness was 
controlled. Study 2 explores some of  the possible links between explanatory 
style and poor health. College students who believe that stable + global fac- 
tors caused bad events reported more unhealthy habits, lower efficacy to 
change these habits, and more stressful occurrences than students who ex- 
plain bad events with unstable + specific causes. 
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The germ model is dead. Illness is now viewed in terms of the interaction 
among biological, psychological, and social factors. Consistent with this ex- 
panded conception, researchers are currently attempting to identify psycho- 
logical precursors of health and illness (e.g., Jemmott & Locke, 1984). Various 
theorists suggest that such psychological states as pessimism, helplessness, 
hopelessness, and apathy are among the important psychological risk fac- 
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tors for illness (e.g., Antonovsky, 1984; Engel, 1971; Kobasa, 1979; Laza- 
rus, 1979; Lefcourt, 1973; Richter, 1957; Rodin, Timko, & Anderson, 1985; 
Seeman & Seeman, 1983). However, clear evidence for a link between these 
negative states and illness is lacking. 
Research in the learned helplessness tradition shows that humans and 
animals exposed to uncontrollable events learn that respOnses and outcomes 
are unrelated. They expect to be helpless in the future, and this negative out- 
look may then produce a host of difficulties for them. Perhaps susceptibili- 
ty to illness is one of these difficulties (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). 
Explanatory style is the individual's habitual tendency to choose certain kinds 
of causal explanations for bad events (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). This in- 
dividual difference has been extensively examined in studies of the attribu- 
tional reformulation of the helplessness model of depression where it is 
thought to channel the effects of uncontrollable bad events (Abramson, Selig- 
man, & Teasdale, 1978). 
According to the helplessness reformulation, a person encountering a 
bad event asks, "Why did this occur?" The answer to this causal question 
affects the person's response. Three dimensions of causal explanation are 
deemed important. An internal explanation ("it's me") is more likely to result 
in a loss of self-esteem than is an external explanation ("it's the economy"). 
A stable explanation ("It's going to last forever") is more likely to produce 
a long-lasting reaction than is an unstable explanation ("it was just one of 
those days"). A global explanation ("it's going to undercut everything I do") 
is more likely to lead to a pervasive reaction than is a specific explanation 
("it's the heat in that place"). 
A person's explanatory style is one of the determinants of the particu- 
lar explanation chosen when that person encounters a bad event (Peterson, 
Bettes, & Seligman, 1985). Some people favor internal, stable, and global 
explanations, while other people favor external, unstable, and specific ex- 
planations. The former individuals are more at risk for depression, demorali- 
zation, passivity, failure, and other helplessness deficits than are the latter 
individuals (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). 
In the first investigation reported here, the relationship between explana- 
tory style and subsequent illness was directly assessed in a sample of college 
students. In the second investigation, some of the possible links between ex- 
planatory style and poor health were explored, again in a sample of college 
students. I chose to study illness among mostly healthy young adults because 
this research program is just beginning and research with student subjects 
is inexpensive and convenient. Generalization of findings to more seriously 
ill groups must necessarily be cautious. 
In Study 1, subjects completed questionnaires at three specific times. 
At Time One, explanatory style and baseline measures of depression and ill- 
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ness (i.e., number of days ill in the past month) were assessed. At Time Two, 
4 weeks later, illness was again measured in the same way. Finally, at Time 
Three, 1 year later, subjects were mailed a questionnaire asking them to report 
how many visits to a physician they had made during the past year. Here 
are the major questions addressed: (1) Does explanatory style predict illness 
during the following month? (2) Does explanatory style predict the number 
of doctor visits during the following year? (3) Do these relationships occur 
when initial illness and depression are held constant? 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Subject and Procedure. The research began during the fall of 1984. 
Research participants were 172 introductory psychology students (57 males, 
115 females) at Virginia Tech, who received extra credit toward their final 
grade. At Time One, 20 to 30 subjects at a time met in single sessions to 
complete the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the Modified Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (ASQ), and the Illness Scale. At Time Two, approxi- 
mately 4 weeks later (spanning the weeklong Thanksgiving break), 170 of 
these subjects (= 99%) returned to again complete the Illness Scale. (Sub- 
jects also completed several other questionnaires at both times, but these are 
not relevant to the present research). At Time Three, approximately 1 year 
later, subjects were mailed a brief questionnaire and a stamped envelope ad- 
dressed to the researcher. They were asked to report the number of visits 
they had made to a physician for diagnosis and/or treatment of an illness 
during the past year, since the time they had originally completed the Time 
One questionnaires. In response to the letter, 105 subjects mailed back the 
questionnaire. A second letter several weeks later resulted in another 41 
responses. In all, then, 146 subjects (= 86%) provided Time Three data. 
Here are brief descriptions of the measures completed by the subjects: 
Beck Depression Inventory. The BDI is a 21-item self-report question- 
naire that assesses the severity of common depressive symptoms like sadness, 
sleep disturbance, and suicidal ideation (Beck, 1967). 
Modified Attributional Style Questionnaire. This questionnaire is an 
expanded version of the one described by Peterson et al. (1982), employing 
the same instructions and format. Subjects are presented with 24 hypotheti- 
cal bad events involving themselves. For instance, the events included "your 
steady romantic relationship ends" and "after your first term at school, you 
are on academic probation." In each case, they are asked to imagine the event 
happening to them. They then write the "one major cause of the event" and 
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rate it in terms of  internality ( = 7) versus externality (=  1) and stability + 
globality (=  7) versus instability + specificity (=  1). The internality rating 
answers the question "Is the cause of  this event something about you or some- 
thing about other people or circumstances?" The stability + globality rating 
answers the question "Is the cause of  this event something that will persist 
across time and affect many areas of  your life or something that will not 
be present again and will affect few situations that you encounter?" (Stabili- 
ty and globality were collapsed for efficiency in Study 1 since they are usual- 
ly highly redundant; see Peterson & Villanova, 1986; Peterson, Villanova, 
& Raps, 1985). The ratings of  the 24 events are averaged separately for in- 
ternality and stability + globality. 
Illness Scale. This self-report measure of  illness asks subjects to list all 
of  the illnesses experienced during the past 30 days (Suls & Mullen, 1981). 
For each illness, the subjects describe the date that the symptoms were first 
noticed and the date that the symptoms were last present. The degree of  ill- 
ness is then calculated as the number of  different days during the month that 
at least one symptom was present. 
Doctor Visits: In the letter sent to the subjects, the following question 
was asked: "Would you please indicate in the space below the number of  
times you have visited a physician since last Thanksgiving for diagnosis and/or  
treatment of  an illness? Do not include routine checkups or visits because 
of  an injury (like a broken leg)." 
Results 
Means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of  the measures are shown 
in Table I. Also presented there are the correlations between Time One vari- 
ables and Tim~e Two illness scores and Time Three doctor visits. The ques- 
tions of  concern are answered in the affirmative for stable + global 
explanatory style. First, this individual difference predicted the number of  
days ill in the following year. Second, it predicted the number of doctor visits 
during the following year. Third, these relationships held even when ini- 
tial illness and depression were partialed out. Internality was not associated 
with subsequent illness. 
Internality and the stability + globality measure were uncorrelated 
(r = - . 0 3 ,  n.s.). Internality was not related to BDI scores (r = .06, n.s.), 
but stability + globality were positively associated (r = .39, p < .001). Time 
One illness was unrelated to any of  the other Time One measures. 
To illustrate the results more concretely, I calculated the mean number 
of  days ill in the following month and the mean number of  doctor visits in 
the following year for subjects in the upper and lower quartiles of  stable + 
global explanatory style. Subjects who favored stable + global explanations re- 
ported twice as many days ill (8.56 vs. 3.70) and almost four times as many doc- 
tor visits (3.56 vs..95) as subjects who favored unstable + specific explanations. 
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Of the subjects reporting illnesses at Time Two, 95°70 described 
colds, sore throats, or flus. One or two individuals reported each of these: 
pneumonia, ear infection, venereal disease, and mononucleosis. In other 
words, all of the illnesses were infectious. Although subjects at Time Three 
were not asked to describe the illness that brought them to a physician, some 
small number of them did so. Every illness described was infectious. 
Discussion 
These findings support the prediction that explanatory style puts an 
individual at risk for illness. Explaining bad events with chronic and perva- 
sive causes foreshadows a later infectious disease. Explanatory style warrants 
further attention in the emerging field of health psychology. In light of the 
recent suggestion that the attempt to explain illness in psychological terms 
is "folklore" (Angell, 1985), the present results are important. They move 
beyond case histories in demonstrating that psychological states can make 
disease more versus less likely. Explanatory style and infectious illness prob- 
ably affect each other, and reciprocal influence between these variables and 
depression is also possible (cf. Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Schleifer, Keller, 
Siris, Davis, & Stein, 1985). At best, Study 1 captures only one causal path, 
but perhaps it is the most intriguing: Explanatory style foreshadows illness. 
STUDY 2 
The correlations found in Study 1 are naked ones, providing no hint 
about what links explanatory style to illness. A number of routes are possi- 
ble. (1) Perhaps individuals who offer stable and global explanations become 
passive in the face o f  disease (Seligman, 1975). (2) Similarly, perhaps individu- 
als with a negative explanatory style neglect the basics o f  health care in the 
first place (Becker, 1974; O'Leary, 1985; Wallston & Wallston, 1982). (3) 
Further, people who offer stable and global explanations for bad events tend 
not to be good problem-solvers (Peterson & Seligman, 1984) and thus may 
experience more bad life events, making illness more likely (Rabin & Streun- 
ing, 1976). (4) Yet another possible pathway is loneliness and lack o f  social 
support (Anderson, Horowitz, & French, 1983; Cobb, 1976). (5) Finally, ex- 
planatory style may directly affect one's immune system (cf. Laudenslager, 
Ryan, Drugan, Hyson, & Maier, 1983). 
In Study 2, several (though not all) of these pathways were investigat- 
ed in a cross-sectional study. These subjects completed various questionnaires, 
including measures of explanatory style, physical illness, healthy versus un- 
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healthy habits, healthy versus unhealthy responses to illness, beliefs about 
the link between behaviors and health, self-efficacy to perform health- 
promoting behaviors, stressful life events, and social support. 
Method 
Subjects and Procedure. Research participants were 126 introductory 
psychology students (52 males, 74 females) at Virginia Tech, who received 
extra credit toward their final grade. Subjects met in groups of 20 to 30 in a 
single session to complete the questionnaires. The following measures were 
completed by each research participant: 
Modified A ttributional Style Questionnaire. This questionnaire is iden- 
tical to the one used in Study 1 except that ratings for stability and globality 
are made separately and then combined. So, subjects provide causal expla- 
nation on 7-point scales according to its internality, stability, and globality. 
The stability and globality ratings are then averaged. 
Questions About Physical Health. This questionnaire poses four ques- 
tions about the subject's health: 
1. In the past 12 months, how many different times were you ill? 
2. In the past 12 months, how many different times did you visit a 
physician for diagnosis and/or treatment of an illness (do not in- 
clude injuries like a broken leg)? 
3. Are you ill right now? definitely no maybe definitely yes 
4. On the whole, how would you rate your physical health? 
The last question is answered on a 7-point rating scale, where 1 = poor and 
7 = excellent. 
Healthy versus Unhealthy Habits. This questionnaire asks subjects about 
eight habits arguably related to good or bad health (cf. Taylor, Denham, 
& Ureda, 1982): eating a balanced diet, avoiding salt, avoiding fat, exercising 
regularly, eating breakfast, not smoking, not drinking more than one glass of 
wine/beer/liquor per day, and sleeping 8 hours every night. Subjects report 
their adherence to each habit on a 7-point rating scale, where 1 = never and 
7 = always. (A ninth unhealthy habit-being overweight-was assessed by 
asking subjects to report their heights and weights. Only 1 subject out of 
126 exceeded "normal" weight limits by more than 20%. Accordingly, obesity 
was not further studied in this sample.) 
Responses to Illness. This questionnaire asks subjects about six possi- 
ble responses to illness: staying home and taking it easy, drinking more fluids 
than usual, getting more sleep than usual, going about usual activities, fol- 
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lowing a balanced diet, and seeing a doctor and following his/her advice. 
Again, each question is answered on a 7-point rating scale, where 1 = never 
and 7 = always. 
Beliefs A bout Life-Style. The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess 
the respondent's outcome expectancy and efficacy expectancy with respect 
to health and illness (Bandura, 1986). In other words, does the subject be- 
lieve there exists a link between particular behaviors and physical health? 
And does the subject believe that he or she can perform these behaviors? 
For each of the eight behaviors in the already-described Habits ques- 
tionnaire, plus the habit of being overweight, a subject is asked the follow- 
ing question: 
Do you believe that this habit determines how healthy you are and 
how long you will live? 
definitely no maybe definitely yes 
Then subjects were asked to provide a percentage from 0 to 100% for each 
of these behaviors in response to the question: "Assuming that you wished 
to adopt or change this habit, how confident are you that you could do so? 
Use 0% to mean that you are not at all confident; use 100% to mean that 
you are completely confident; use intermediate percentages to mean you have 
intermediate degrees of confidence." 
College Schedule of  Recent Experience. This life events questionnaire 
is designed for college students (Marx, Garrity, & Bowers, 1975). For each 
of 47 stressful occurrences (e.g., have been found guilty of minor violations 
of the law), subjects indicate the number of times they experienced it during 
the past 12 months: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or more. This questionnaire is scored simply 
by adding these ratings. 
Social Support Inventory. This questionnaire measures the degree to 
which subjects experience social support (Barrera, Sandler, &Ramsay, 1981). 
It presents respondents with 40 supportive activities (e.g., someone let you 
know that you did something well) and asks them to indicate with a 5-point 
scale the frequency that each happened during the past 4 weeks, where 1 = 
not at all and 5 = about every day. 
Results 
To simplify presentation of the data, composite scores were formed 
by averaging responses to the Habits questionnaire, the Responses to Illness 
questionnaire, to the outcome expectancy items on the Life-Style question- 
naire, and to the efficacy expectancy items on the Life-Style questionnaire, 
reverse-scoring items where appropriate. Responses to the four questions 
about physical health were first normalized and then combined into an equally 
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weighted composite. Means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of the meas- 
ures are presented in Table II. The reliabilities ranged from low (responses 
to illness, internal explanatory style, healthy habits) to moderate (efficacy 
expectations, illness, outcome expectations) to excellent (life events, stable 
+ global explanatory style, social support). Consistent with the findings in 
Study 1, the composite measure of illness in Study 2 correlated with stable 
+ global explanations for bad events (r = .25, p < .003) but not with inter- 
nal explanations (r = .00, n.s.). 
I calculated the correlations between the measures of possible links and 
explanatory style on the one hand and between them and illness on the other 
hand. Stable + global explanatory style correlated negatively with healthy 
habits (r = - .26, p < .05) and efficacy expectations (r = - .20, p < .05) 
and positively with life events (r = .25, p < .05). Internality correlated nega- 
tively with social support (r = - .23, p < .05). The composite measure of 
illness correlated negatively with healthy habits (r = - . 23 ,  p < .05) and 
positively with life events (r = . 18, p < .05) but not with efficacy expecta- 
tions (r = - . 14 ,  n.s.). 
These correlations suggest that unhealthy habits and stressful life events 
may mediate the link between explanatory style and physical illness. Possi- 
bly implicated is low self-efficacy to promote one's own health. When these 
variables were partialed from the correlation between stable + global ex- 
planatory style and illness, this correlation was attenuated as one would ex- 
pect. So, with healthy habits held constant, the explanatory style-illness 
correlation became .20 (p < .05). With life events held constant, the corre- 
Table II. Study Two: Means and Reliabilities of Measures 
(N = 126) a 
Measure X SD Reliability 
Modified ASQ 
Internality 4.74 .43 .39 
Stability + globality 4.40 .70 .90 
Illness 
Times ill 2.84 2.64 
Doctor visits 1.66 2.30 
Current illness 1.55 .83 
Health in general 4.71 .99 
Composite (see text) 0 2.83 .68 
Healthy habits 4.59 .72 .40 
Response to illness 4.94 .75 .31 
Outcome expectations 2.52 .28 .75 
Efficacy expectations 77.27 11.69 .60 
Life events 33.64 15.22 .85 
Social support 2.53 .74 .96 
"Reliability estimated by Cronbach's (1951) alpha. 
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lation between explanatory style and illness became .21 (p < .05). Finally, 
partialing out self-efficacy reduced the correlation slightly to .23 (p < .05). 
When habits, life events, and self-efficacy were simultaneously partialed from 
the correlation between explanatory style and illness, it became nonsignifi- 
cant (r = .15). Note that no single link, at least as measured here, is suffi- 
cient to explain why explanatory style puts someone at risk for illness. 
Whatever bridges the two must be complex. 
Discussion 
Because the data in Study 2 are cross-sectional, interpretation is difficult. 
The results nevertheless imply that explanatory style may affect subsequent 
illness in at least several ways. Not investigated here is the possibility that 
explanatory style is related to immune function, although pilot work by 
Kamen, Seligman, and Rodin (1986) find that explanatory style correlates with 
immunosuppression. 
Here is a process compatible with the present results. Individuals who 
offer stable + global explanations for bad events tend to behave in unhealthy 
ways because they feel unable to change their bad habits. They are likely to 
fall ill. At the same time, these individuals tend to create problems for them- 
selves, and they experience stressful life events. Again, they are likely to fall 
ill. Compounding matters even further for these pessimistic individuals is 
the possibility that they tend to fight off disease poorly. 
Longitudinal research is obviously needed to test this hypothesized 
process. In such an investigation, one must be alert to the possibility of bi- 
directional influence among all the variables. The origins of explanatory style 
have received much less attention than its consequences (cf. Peterson & Selig- 
man, 1984), but it is conceivable that possible links between explanatory style 
and poor health like bad life events and unhealthy habits are additionally 
determinants of explanatory style. 
Researchers should probably not settle prematurely on one particular 
mechanism to bear the burden for explaining correlations between psycho- 
logical states and illness. In a sample of college students, it is not surprising 
that outcome expectancies and social support bear little relationship to ex- 
planatory style or illness. In a sample of less educated, older, and/or more 
isolated individuals, these variables might play an important role in linking 
negative outlooks with illness. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together, the two studies reported here document a link between 
explanatory style and illness, and suggest that this link may be mediated in 
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several different ways. That a cognitive individual difference able to be as- 
sessed with a brief questionnaire can predict subsequent health and illness 
is an exciting finding. Still, there are some puzzles in the present data. 
For instance, internality did not  correlate with illness. If anything, the 
trend was in the opposite direction in Study 1. Why this should be so is un- 
clear. There are hints in the literature that internal explanatory style is not 
a unitary dimension, that it subsumes two quite different causal explana- 
tions: characterological attributions ("I'm a wretched person") and behavioral 
attributions ("I made a mistake") (e.g., Peterson, Schwartz, & Seligman, 
1981). Not surprisingly, internality tends to be the least reliable dimension 
of explanatory style and to bear the least coherent relationship to other vari- 
ables (Peterson & Villanova, 1986; Peterson, Villanova, & Raps, 1985). 
Perhaps these preclude a consistent relationship between internality and 
illness. 
Another puzzle is that in Study 1, Time One illness was not  related to 
explanatory style. To the degree that explanatory style is a stable trait, one 
would expect it to correlate with illness at all times. Perhaps explanatory 
style is more in flux than heretofore proposed. As I earlier noted, the rela- 
tionship between illness and explanatory style may show a reciprocal in- 
fluence. What this means is that explanatory style may change over time, 
although at any given moment it is a demonstrable risk factor for subsequent 
difficulties. 
Three qualifications of the present research must be made. First, the 
obtained correlations between explanatory style and illness are quite modest 
in magnitude. On the one hand, this is hardly surprising since health and 
illness have numerous and complex determinants. On the other hand, perhaps 
the present correlations underestimate the actual relationship between ex- 
planatory style and illness. Measures were not perfectly reliable. The range 
of illness among subjects was truncated. The time spans studied may not 
have been optimal. 
Second, the measures of illness relied on self-report by the research par- 
ticipants. Although these measures showed a consistent relationship with ex- 
planatory style, their relationship to an "objective" medical examination is 
not entirely clear. In favor of these measures, they have face validity and 
have been used in previous research. Kobasa (1979) demonstrated that self- 
report of simple and specific illnesses agrees highly with medical diagnosis. 
Also in favor of these measures is that their most likely contaminant 
(a response set of complaining) can be ruled out in Study 1, since the proce- 
dure of partialing out initial depression and initial illness controls for com- 
plaining. If subjects were simply complaining (or not) in response to all of 
the questionnaires, one would expect higher correlations between the con- 
temporaneous measures than between these measures and reports of illness 
30 days later or 365 days later. That was not the case. 
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Still, there is no single criterion of  health. The researcher must look 
for convergence across different measures. The present studies show that ex- 
planatory style is related to "illness" as measured by self-reported symptoms 
and doctor visits. Several other recent studies find correlations between ex- 
planatory style and "illness" as measured by physician examination, early 
mortality, and poor  immune function (Peterson & Seligman, 1987). Thus, 
I have confidence in my conclusion that explanatory style is related to physi- 
cal illness. 
The third limitation here is that the research subjects were for the most 
part healthy young adults. This may have worked against finding any sig- 
nificant relations between psychological factors and illness. By this view, the 
present correlations are particularly notable. But generalization to popula- 
tions at risk for serious illness is not warranted without further research. 
In sum, the present studies examined the popular hypothesis that nega- 
tive psychological states are a risk factor for illness. Explanatory style predict- 
ed the degree of  infectious disease during the following month and the number 
of  doctor visits during the following year, even when the level of  previous 
illness was controlled. The possible links between explanatory style and ill- 
ness include unhealthy habits like poor  nutrition, smoking, and drinking, 
stressful life events, a n d -  poss ib ly -  low self-efficacy to promote one's own 
health. 
It may someday be possible to identify individuals at risk for illness 
by the way that they explain bad events. I have elsewhere described how ex- 
planatory style can be assessed through the content analysis of  causal expla- 
nations that occur in verbal material (Peterson, Bettes, & Seligman, 1985; 
Peterson, Luborsky, & Seligman, 1983; Peterson & Seligman, 1984, 1984). 
This means that explanatory style can be scored retrospectively from archived 
material like letters, diaries, and open-ended interviews. Perhaps it will some- 
day be possible to change an unhealthy explanatory style with the known 
techniques of  cognitive therapy (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), increas- 
ing the quality and quantity of  life. 
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